I did not vote for the initial bond measure to launch the California High Speed Rail. From what I read at that time the critics thought the supporters of the measure (1) under-estimated the cost and (2) over-estimated the ridership.
This item over at Bloomberg seems to indicate that the supporters had an inkling of the problems but nonetheless decided to sell the project with estimates that were very dubious.
Excerpts:
Sold to the public in 2008 as a visionary plan to whisk riders along at 220 miles an hour, making the trip from San Francisco to Los Angeles in a little over two and a half hours, the project promised to attract most of the necessary billions from private investors, to operate without ongoing subsidies and to charge fares low enough to make it competitive with cheap flights. With those assurances, 53.7 percent of voters said yes to a $9.95 billion bond referendum to get the project started. But the assurances were at best wishful thinking, at worst an elaborate con.
[......]
The total construction cost estimate has now more than doubled to $68 billion from the original $33 billion, despite trims in the routes planned.
[.....]
When the Spanish construction company Ferrovial submitted its winning bid for a 22-mile segment, the proposal included a clear and inconvenient warning: “More than likely, the California high speed rail will require large government subsidies for years to come.” Ferrovial reviewed 111 similar systems around the world and found only three that cover their operating costs.
[.....]
But a closer look even back then would have made it clear that, barring a miracle, the rail project wouldn’t keep its promises. To do so, it would have to be the fastest, most popular bullet train in the world, with many more riders per mile and a much greater percentage of seats occupied than the French and Japanese systems -- a highly unlikely prospect. Yet only the most determined wonk would have discovered these comparisons.
No comments:
Post a Comment